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Abstract 
The No Fault Found (NFF) problem continues to reduce operational availability and have an impact on cost and resources in the 
RAF.  Following extensive research by the Centre for Innovative Manufacturing in Through-Life Engineering Services, access 
was provided to a significant number of RAF aircraft maintenance personnel under the sponsorship of Air Command at RAF 
High Wycombe.  Maintenance personnel from seven different aircraft fleets, including large aircraft, fast jets and rotary 
platforms were involved. A number of substantial conclusions were made resulting in 26 recommendations.  The paper reviews 
and substantiates these conclusions and recommendations.  
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1. Introduction 
The problem of faults which cannot be confirmed or the 
root cause cannot be found, has plagued all industries for 
many years. When a fault is reported by an operator 
maintenance effort must be used on fault diagnosis but if no 
fault can be identified the situation is known as No-Fault-
Found (NFF). The work done that results in a NFF having to 
be recorded costs time and effort either at the operator level or 
further down the repair chain for items that have been 
removed for investigation [1] ;  there is also an inevitable loss 
in availability of the asset or assets. A definition therefore of 
NFF is:  
A fault that cannot be replicated or where no cause can be 
identified that would have generated the reported 
symptoms. 
Access to maintenance data is often difficult and 
particularly at the granularity required to determine the true 
level of NFF occurring in an organization. Often managers are 
blissfully unaware as maintenance personnel are prone to hide 
what they may see as failure to find the fault.  Other reasons 
for the inability to determine the true level of NFF vary from 
cultural and human factors reasons to process and 
organizational issues. The true levels of NFF are thus 
extremely difficult to determine and even more difficult to 
properly cost.  
As part of the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD’s) membership 
of the Centre for Innovative Manufacturing in Through-Life 
Engineering Services, access was made possible for 
researchers to interview over 70 maintenance personnel 
working on seven different aircraft fleets. A range of 
personnel of different rank and experience were interviewed 
in order to ensure that the results were statistically valid. 
Following research previously completed by an RAF senior 
technician, Chief Technician Stuart Roke [2] for his MSc 
thesis on the NFF problems of the Harrier aircraft and other 
literature reviews, a questionnaire was developed that 
specifically tackled previously identified attitudes and 
processes in the RAF when dealing with the NFF issue [3].  
The aim of the questionnaire was firstly to validate both the 
previous research by Roke which used only one aircraft fleet 
and the maintenance personnel experienced on that fleet.  
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Secondly it was to significantly expand the research in order 
to provide an assessment of the NFF levels across the whole 
of the RAF and ascertain if there were any differences 
between the fleets of multi-engine aircraft, fast-jet aircraft and 
helicopters. Twenty-six separate conclusions and 
recommendations were developed from this research [3].  
Whilst the personnel interviewed were currently working on 
seven different aircraft, the range of ranks and experience was 
quite diverse. Many of those interviewed had worked on other 
aircraft and brought that experience to their responses. 
Inevitably however, there were a high number of junior ranks 
particular on the two larger fleets and many of their responses 
were therefore in the “don’t know” category.  Nevertheless 
because of the large number of personnel interviewed overall 
there were enough responses to each question to provide a 
significant positive or negative view to be registered. Whilst 
there were 27 questions, each person was encouraged to 
complete the questionnaire in isolation and was then 
interviewed in depth by the two researchers who were able to 
expand the views and responses to each question and to 
record additional anecdotal corroboration.  
The questions were framed in such a way as to provide an 
unbiased answer [4].  Whilst each question was then analyzed 
and reported, the views from interviews often crossed over 
many different questions so providing a body of evidence 
under more general topic headings.  These more general topic 
headings then allowed conclusions and recommendations to 
be formulated, which are explained in the following sections. 
 
 
Nomenclature 
AESO Aircraft Engineering Standing Order 
BIT Built in Test 
LITS Logistic Information Technology System 
LRUs Line Replaceable Units 
MAA Military Aviation Authority 
MOD Ministry of Defence 
NFF No Fault Found 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RAT Repeat Arising Tool 
2. Survey results 
2.1. Fault reporting 
Despite a general impression that aircrew debrief and 
report every fault satisfactorily and accurately, subsequent 
questioning confirmed that there was much variation. Indeed 
whilst some positives were identified, too many negatives 
were also described. There were some improvements on the 
most modern fleet due to improved technology and systems 
for reporting faults, but even these could be easily improved.  
The use of a special fault reporting proforma for the legacy 
fleets was often cited as a way to capture the relevant 
information more accurately and provide a step-by-step 
process that guarantees relevant information for the 
maintenance personnel is always captured. Ensuring aircrew 
give a comprehensive debrief as possible to the right level of 
skilled maintenance personnel was a key enabler to reducing 
subsequent NFFs.   
An example of best practice was a computerized fault 
reporting process that had been developed for the Tornado.  It 
was in effect a computerized debrief proforma, which ensured 
that as much relevant information and symptoms were 
captured as to what the aircraft was doing when the fault 
occurred. This allowed the engineers to have as 
comprehensive picture as possible for their fault diagnosis. 
Experience of both aircrew and engineers were clearly a 
factor in both fault reporting by the aircrew and the 
interpretation of the report by the engineers. Inexperience by 
the aircrew might highlight irrelevant factors or might have 
caused the fault in the first place. Inexperienced engineers 
might make incorrect assumptions on the diagnostic path to 
take.  All were likely to end in a NFF. 
2.2. Fault history 
It was clear that there was inconsistency across the RAF 
with the ability for all engineers, regardless of rank to have 
access to fault history and this limited the ability of the more 
junior ranks to show initiative and resourcefulness in fault 
diagnosis and to show their development potential.  In some 
areas it was a lack of maintenance data terminals but there 
was a general policy of not being trained and authorized to 
access the terminals and therefore the fault history until 
achieving the rank of corporal.  Without the ability to 
investigate fault history adequately, it was inevitable that 
many diagnostic tasks would merely repeat past failed 
maintenance tasks or replace the same item that had clearly 
not solved the problem on the previous occasion.  This 
maintenance task would consequently appear as a fault being 
rectified but was in fact nugatory work and was hiding the 
true level of NFF.  
There was consequently a reliance on diaries monitored by 
the trade manager, but such diaries rely on the thoroughness 
and availability of the manger and are less than perfect. 
Fault history also relies on the quality of information 
written on the job cards, which was deemed to be extremely 
variable particularly as equipment travels further down the 
supply chain for subsequent test and repair.  If the original 
fault information is not comprehensive the original fault may 
be missed and be dormant, so occurring subsequently when 
the item is returned to service.   
2.3. Repeat arisings 
Certain units or components have intermittent faults or 
faults which defy all attempts by test and repair organizations 
to solve them; they are so-called “rogue units”.  Any 
diagnostic process should therefore first check whether the 
reported fault is a repeat arising, yet the study showed there 
was a general lack of awareness of both the need for and of 
the benefits of tracking repeat arisings as a vital aid in the 
identification of “rogue” items.  Whilst the MOD’s 
maintenance data system (LITS) does have a facility - the 
Repeat Arising Tool (RAT) - for checking for a repeat arising, 
it was not enabled for every fleet and was in itself difficult to 
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use and access. Navigation was required through numerous 
levels before the correct page was presented. 
Other systems in use included a local database where units 
being tested and repaired were all monitored on a locally 
produced database that specifically tracked how often the item 
had been through the facility and such information as to work 
done during its last visit and numbers of hours operated 
between visits.  This identified “rogue units” successfully 
among other things and the rogue units could be quarantined. 
2.4. Human factors 
Human Factors issues were clearly an over-arching reason 
for personnel avoiding to declare NFF.  In the past there had 
been more of a blame culture but there was now more 
recognition of the need for honesty in admitting mistakes or 
the inability to find a fault.  Consequently, whilst human 
nature would always be prevalent in not wishing to admit 
failure, this was less of an issue in the modern RAF. Time and 
pressure, however, were still perceived to be reasons that 
effective diagnosis would or could not be carried out. Again 
the more “just culture” that now existed had reduced the 
number of occasions that time or pressure would cause a NFF.  
2.5. Policy and procedures 
The research showed that there was an inconsistent policy 
across the RAF for the management of NFF. There was 
currently no general, overarching, policy for dealing with 
NFF. The accepted policy document, AP100B-01 would be 
the natural place for such a policy for the management of NFF 
in general terms.  It would direct each aircraft fleet to have a 
local order for the management and resolution of NFF in the 
form of an Aircraft Engineering Standing Order (AESO). The 
general top-level policy was needed to provide consistency 
where none existed at present. If true that in some 
circumstances that a NFF was a potential safety issue, then 
this was a serious issue needing to be resolved.  
On stations where there was an AESO, it was clear that if it 
was too complicated it would not be applied properly or 
thoroughly, so there was a case for a balance to be struck 
between it being too simple and too bureaucratic and 
complicated. An AESO at station level provides the structure 
for dealing with NFF and is an excellent and effective 
management tool with which to highlight the impact of NFF 
and the need to identify and track repeat arisings.  
2.6. Management information 
The research results highlighted more and more about the 
need for quality management information.  As with human 
factors where there is often a reluctance to declare NFF and to 
consequently code it as NFF in the management information, 
the research showed that this resulted in the inability of 
management to realize the true level of NFF.  Reasons for this 
reluctance were established as complex and ranged from 
reluctance to admit defeat to the pressure caused by needing 
to show something had been done. Nevertheless, it was 
seriously reducing the management information as to the 
exact impact and cost of the NFF problem. Education was 
thus required to explain the need for coding and declaration of 
NFF which was essential if management was to be able to 
monitor the true impact and costs. 
Much of the management information required was being 
hidden by the prevalent use of alternative phrases which 
avoided the need to declare NFF.  The use of descriptive 
phrases, such as “tested satis,” in fact hide the fact that a test 
has been carried out and no fault shown; so this must be 
coded as a NFF in order for the management information to 
be correct. 
There was clear evidence that personnel believed that NFF 
was being under-recorded; it was partly an education issue 
where it was necessary to emphasize that it was acceptable to 
declare NFF and this should be seen as part of the wider “just 
culture” attitude and not something bad.   
The research showed that regular monitoring and analysis 
of NFF rates system by system and subsystem by subsystem 
was regularly needed on all fleets in order to identify and 
reduce NFF rates.  
2.7. Reasons and contributory factors for NFF 
The experience of both aircrew and engineers was 
highlighted as being a significant factor in causing NFF. On 
the other hand NFF was often not declared due to personal 
pride in trying to locate a fault.  Lack of sufficient and clear 
debrief information from aircrew was also cited as a cause.   
Technical ‘manuals’ were also frequently mentioned as a 
cause of NFF due to inaccuracies or procedures that were hard 
to interpret and to apply. 
‘Time’, ‘Pressure’ and ‘People’ factors were also identified 
by the research as inextricably inter-related in causing NFF to 
be declared (Figure 1).  ‘Pressure’ was often self-induced and 
there was still some pressure being experienced by some 
engineers, usually in order to deliver operational availability 
[5] to meet the flying programmes. ‘Time’ and ‘Pressure’ 
were, however, often cited as reasons for NFF due to the 
shortage of assets, which meant aircraft availability was often 
critical requiring the changing of something, e.g. a component 
or subsystem, that was available.  
The improved safety culture (post Haddon-Cave) has, 
nevertheless, established that in general ‘Pressure’ is not felt 
in the same way as it used to be. ‘Time’ was cited as a 
contributory factor because if everything is done in 
accordance with the published procedures it would take too 
Figure 1 – Main reasons for NFF problems on fleet 
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long.  Consequently, NFF might be the result of procedures 
that were short cut or not done thoroughly. ‘Other’ reasons 
cited were, spurious faults on computer systems with NFF 
being caused by software nine times out of 10 occasions. A 
common theme across all the fleets analyzed was that NFF 
was most prevalent in general avionic systems and that it was 
often software that was suspected as the main cause.  
2.8. Engineering practice 
Post Haddon-Cave and the creation of the Military 
Aviation Authority (MAA) meant that the culture or 
behaviours had indeed changed for the better with 
maintenance personnel now more at ease with resisting 
pressure and spending the correct amount of time on 
diagnostics and with no fear of stating an NFF.  
Research showed that on some fleets where there were 
insufficient spares, it did generate attitudes of changing an 
item just because it was in stock.  This would inevitably 
usually generate an NFF. In most fleets surveyed, the 
availability of the required spares was a problem and so it did 
generate a higher level of changing what was in stock rather 
than what should be changed. This generates what is known 
as “Phantom Supply Chain,” where changing what is in stock 
is the norm and so the supply system sees a higher turnover of 
those items and therefore procures more. Meanwhile the real 
item that is required is not available and is not changed and 
therefore no more are procured. The supply system, therefore, 
can be said to be having an impact on the type and 
effectiveness of maintenance being conducted.  
Research also showed that the practice of changing 
multiple Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) to solve a particular 
fault is quite often done usually as a way of saving time to 
declare the aircraft as serviceable and available as soon as 
possible (Figure 2). As the subsequent NFF costs are hidden 
(further down the repair chain) there is no incentive to avoid 
this practice; it nevertheless places excess strain on the supply 
and support system and causes extra cost that could be 
avoided.  
2.9. Engineering issues 
Research and analysis of questionnaires identified Built in 
Test (BIT) that is used whilst the aircraft is on the ground is 
not representative of flight conditions and therefore might not 
isolate some faults.  Whilst fairly obvious it is a continuing 
frustration for maintenance personnel. Similarly personnel 
identified that manuals and processes have to be correct so 
that when a BIT identifies a fault, the correct and reliable 
process is available to find the root cause quickly.  
Representative flight conditions, such as temperature, 
vibrations and altitude, cannot be replicated on the ground and 
therefore often result in NFF as the fault is unable to be 
reproduced. On-aircraft ground tests and off-aircraft bench 
tests are therefore generally unrepresentative of the true 
operational or environmental conditions and many examples 
could be quoted by personnel interviewed. Nevertheless, it is 
accepted that more representative testing is probably too 
difficult in most cases, particularly where off-aircraft bench 
testing is done in isolation of other integral aircraft systems; 
in this case the tests are unrepresentative of the actual aircraft 
system operation and the other aircraft system inputs. 
Vibration and temperature though were agreed as being very 
useful for many items as well as being able to represent the 
longer sorties now being completed by some aircraft; it was 
accepted that “G” is the one condition that cannot be applied 
to any off-aircraft testing.  
Conducting the test and repair of components as close as 
possible to where the user is operating provides a much better 
service to those maintaining the operational availability of the 
user.  An example of where improvements in testing and 
repair procedures were made was shown after testing in an 
environmental chamber; it identified issues that were unable 
to be seen by normal testing in the bay and these were able to 
generate improvements  in the repair procedures and 
processes.  It was clear that certain LRUs with high NFF rates 
and where vibration and/or temperature are suspected as 
contributory factors, could benefit from being tested in an 
environmental chamber.  
2.10. Training and awareness 
One of the most clear and positive results from the 
questionnaire and subsequent interviews was the need for 
training and education on a range of issues from basic 
awareness of the costs and impact of NFF to training on 
diagnosis techniques (Figure 3).  There was a requirement to 
fully understand what was a NFF. Opportunities were 
available on the various aircraft Qualification Courses (Q 
Courses) and on the junior management courses to highlight 
the impact and costs of NFF.  However, training on the 
general issue and impact of NFF is almost non-existent and 
was overwhelmingly agreed as being necessary.  
Figure 3 – Would NFF resolution training help? 
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Figure 2 - Are there occasions when multiple LRUs are 
removed? 
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3. State of the art in aircraft maintenance 
Similar research into the human factors issues that impact 
NFF has been conduct in the civilian airline industry [1] [6].  
Topics covered included testing resources, both on and off 
aircraft, maintenance manuals, organizational pressures and 
training. The results correlate with those discussed above.   
Lack of training on test equipment and unrepresentative 
test conditions were similarly cited, with some stating they 
had received no training on test equipment.  This analysis had 
not considered whether the maintainer had received any NFF 
training so a direct comparison with the RAF cannot be made. 
However, within the best practice guidelines specific NFF 
training was recommended. Additionally, “the quality and 
lack of comprehensive technical content” [1] of manuals 
affected the ability of the maintenance personnel to conduct 
adequate diagnostics into the cause of the fault. Time and 
pressure were likewise given as a reason for not being able to 
correctly diagnose the fault.  
4. Conclusion 
The research and analysis undertaken identified was 
comprehensive and thorough and statistically significant 
having interviewed over 70 personnel. The range of 
experience and rank ensured that the conclusions and 
recommendations would be credible. The foregoing sections 
have summarized the conclusions and the 26 
recommendations for the MOD which if applied would make 
a significant impact on their NFF costs. 
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